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Abstract 
 
We examine the existing literature to highlight what we do (and do not) know about 
entrepreneurial finance and its relationship with growth. Broadly, there is a need for research 
to go beyond traditional supply side/market failure issues to better understand the role of 
entrepreneurial cognition, objectives, ownership types and firm life-cycle stages in 
financing/investment decisions. We show that we know little about the pivotal relationship 
between access to external finance and growth due to limitations in current approaches to 
testing financial constraints. Instead, we propose that we should look at the relationship 
between funding gaps and business performance as a direct and nuanced approach to 
identifying financial constraints in different entrepreneurial finance markets. There is also a 
need for research to disentangle cognitive from financial constraints and to better 
understand the role of financiers in enabling growth. In particular, there is a need to better 
understand the relationship between non-bank sources of finance and growth, shorn of 
inherent survival and selection bias. We outline an agenda for future research to address 
gaps in our understanding. 
  
                                                 
*
 The research for the paper was funded by ESRC grant no. ES/K006614/1. 
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Introduction 
Following the financial crisis, many economies have seen a significant decline in both debt 
and equity finance flows to SMEs. Consequently, there are concerns that the associated 
funding gap may be limiting firm growth and as a result constraining economic recovery.  
The UK, in particular, provides strong prima facie evidence about the persistent structural 
problems in the markets for both traditional bank credit and alternative sources of finance 
such as venture capital. Indeed, the UK Government has established a British Business 
Bank, modeled on the lines of the German state-owned bank Kreditanstalt für Weideraufbau 
(KfW), to help improve flows of debt/equity finance to SMEs. 
The issue of funding gaps, in the provision of debt and equity, as a constraint on the 
development of small businesses is not new. In the UK, The MacMillan Committee (1931) 
and Bolton Committee (1971) long ago identified gaps in the supply of small scale equity 
investments to small businesses. The Small Firms Loan Guarantee (SFLG) was introduced 
in 1981 to overcome a perceived gap in credit availability reported in Wilson Committee 
(1979). More recently, reports have drawn attention to: the lack of competition in the supply 
of banking services to SMEs (Cruickshank, 2000; Independent Commission on Banking, 
2011);  shortcomings in the provision of growth capital (Rowlands, 2009); the need to 
promote the supply of non-bank sources of finance since the financial crisis (Breedon, 
 DQG WKH EHQHILWV RI HVWDEOLVKLQJ D µRQH VWRS VKRS¶ IRU EXVLQHVV VXSSRUW LQ WKH 8.
similar to KfW (Breedon, 2012). 
The issues involved in understanding funding gaps are complex. It is not easy to disentangle 
whether a drop in the amount of funding results from low demand or contraction in funding 
supply. The explanation of the latter, which has dominated the policy discussion, is often 
rooted in market failure: the fixed costs of screening and monitoring smaller/younger 
businesses, which are more informationally opaque, may be prohibitively high. The resulting 
information asymmetries may give rise to problems of adverse selection and/or moral hazard 
leading to credit rationing (Stiglitiz and Weiss, 1981).  In these circumstances, funding may 
only be available where the entrepreneur has some track record (Petersen and Rajan, 1994) 
or can demonstrate commitment to the business, such as through providing collateral 
(Bester, 1985).  Recent developments in credit scoring have helped lower the fixed costs of 
lending and reduce reliance on collateral LPSURYLQJVPDOOILUPV¶DFFHVVWRILQDQFH$OOHQHW
al., 2004). Indeed, improvements in the credit information infrastructure might be expected to 
help the flow of finance to SMEs and overcome some of the asymmetries. A potential 
downside is that existing lenders hoard information on commercial lending via the credit 
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referencing agencies (CRA) which creates a barrier to entry for new lenders (Ariccia, 1998; 
Bofondi and Gobbi, 2006). The need to make credit data on SMEs available is understood 
and acknowledged by governments, and in the UK it is an integral part of the policy 
discussion about competition in the banking industry.1 
As with bank borrowing, firms seeking equity finance often lack a track record to mitigate the 
informational asymmetry problem. In situations of high informational asymmetries which 
would deter an ordinary investor, venture capitalists have developed various efficient 
methods of selecting high quality ventures and monitoring/adding value to their portfolio 
(Amit et al., 1998). However, the contrast between the UK and US experience suggests that 
the growth of a venture capital industry to support SME financing is not guaranteed (Wright, 
et al., 2005).  
Whilst research has focused on supply side issues, a largely underdeveloped area is the 
role of entrepreneurial cognition in financing/investment decisions (Wright and Stigliani, 
2013). Individuals face limitations in their ability to process information, which may lead to 
various heuristics and cognitive biases (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). These biases are 
especially likely in entrepreneurial contexts (Baron, 1998). Cognitive biases may affect how 
entrepreneurs frame and evaluate the options available to them.  For example, preferences 
for avoiding losses may mean entrepreneurs decide not to invest in and grow their 
businesses.  Other research suggests a tendency among entrepreneurs toward µSRVLWLYH
LOOXVLRQV¶ (Taylor, 1989). Entrepreneurs tend to over-estimate their ability/under-estimate risk 
(Kahneman and Lovallo, 1994) which may lead to over-investment (de Meza and Southey, 
1996).  While previous research points to the importance of cognitive biases in 
entrepreneurial finance, we still have little understanding of their actual impact on 
investment/financing decisions and growth.  
These supply and demand side factors play out across the financial life-cycle of the firm. The 
informational opacity of the firm changes over time (Berger and Udell, 1998) and this affects 
the nature of firm financing. On the demand side cognitive biases may change over time as 
the entrepreneur gains experience (Fraser and Greene, 2006). Additionally, path 
dependencies may play an important role in locking firms in and out of markets for finance. 
In aggregate, the overall observed changes in access to finance would then be affected by 
the distribution of firms along the aforementioned life cycle.  
                                                 
1
 See https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/competition-in-banking-improving-access-to-sme-
credit-data/competition-in-banking-improving-access-to-sme-credit-data. 
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Recognizing the nuanced and dynamic nature of supply and demand side factors, our aim is 
to address the following question: What do we understand about the relationship between 
entrepreneurial finance and growth? We review the academic literature on the relevant 
issues. In section 2 we present a schematic view of the relationship between entrepreneurial 
finance and growth which draws together different parts of the literature whilst also 
highlighting areas we are less sure about. This sets the scene for the discussion in the 
remainder of the paper: financing decisions (section 3); debt and equity funding gaps and 
their relationship with growth (section 4); and, beyond finance, the role of financiers in 
enabling growth (section 5). We conclude by discussing some of the gaps in understanding 
that future research needs to address. Overall, we attempt to identify the gaps in the 
literature that should be addressed to better inform policy making.  
 
Relationship between entrepreneurial finance and growth ± schematic overview 
Entrepreneurs have differing growth objectives and may be at different stages in their own 
lifecycle and the lifecycle of their ventures. Many entrepreneurs, for example, are motivated 
by lifestyle factors and may have little need for external finances.  Others, whilst having 
future growth plans, may not yet be ready to grow.  
There are also other complexities. Entrepreneurial cognition influences the decision to seek 
external finance by affecting perceptions of growth opportunities and/or the desire/perceived 
ability to exploit these opportunities. Start-up entrepreneurs may be reluctant to let go of 
control but also established family firms with underlying growth prospects may be reluctant 
to take on external funding that either dilutes family ownership or involves taking on debt that 
would put family ownership at risk in the event of difficulties in servicing the debt.   
Previous research has looked at different parts of the relationship between entrepreneurial 
finance and growth: capital structure and sources of finance; market failure in the supply of 
entrepreneurial finance; internal/personal finance constraints on growth; and the special role 
of venture capital in building high growth firms. We, therefore, start by locating these 
different parts of the entrepreneurial finance literature into paths leading from the initial 
funding decisions through to growth mindful that, in view of the gaps in understanding 
identified in the introduction, we may think we are measuring financial constraints on growth 
when in fact we are measuring cognitive (and motivational) constraints.  
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Figure 1 provides a snapshot of the financing journey at a particular point in time, yet firms 
will experience changing needs over the financial growth life-cycle. Start-ups traditionally 
rely on insider finance, trade credit and, to a lesser degree, angel finance. More recently, 
start-ups may use crowd-funding and accelerators (see below) as sources of funding. As the 
firm grows and gains a track record, it is more OLNHO\ WREHFRPH µLQYHVWRU UHDG\¶ WRDFFHVV
external finance such as bank debt, venture capital and public debt/equity. 
The pace of growth matters also. Growth orientated/ready businesses will be more likely to 
seek external finance to meet their higher capital demands (Cosh et al., 2009). Hence, more 
dynamic growth orientated firms tend to follow the upper path in Figure 1 and seek external 
finance while less dynamic lifestyle businesses tend to follow the lower path and rely more 
on internal finance. For some firms with growth potential, a change in ownership structure 
associated with additional forms of debt and equity finance may be appropriate, such as in 
growth oriented management buyouts and listings on stock markets. In other words, 
business size, age and ownership form interact with growth potential to affect financing 
decisions. 
Aside from factors such as growth potential and HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ growth objectives, 
HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ perceptions matter as well. Perceptions that the supply of finance is poor 
may result in GLVFRXUDJHPHQWDQGUHOLDQFHRQLQWHUQDOILQDQFHµGLVFRXUDJHGERUURZHUV¶: Kon 
and Storey, 2003; or discouraged finance seekers: Xiang et al, 2014,QVKRUWWKHµSHFNLQJ
RUGHU¶ RI VRXUFHVRI ILQDQFH VHHEHORZPD\EHVNHZHG WRZDUGV LQWHUQDO finance not just 
because it is actually harder to obtain external finance (due to market failure) but also 
because it is perceived to be harder (Fraser, 2014). This is in addition to any preferences for 
using internal finance due to control-loss aversion and the general sufficiency of internal 
finance for lifestyle businesses. Perceptions may be shifted if growing firms recognise and 
seek advice about what they can do to make themselves ready for different types of 
investors over different growth phases.  
Figure 1 highlights the potential for funding gaps to constrain growth (and points to a more 
direct approach to testing financial constraints outlined below).  But whilst growing firms may 
need finance to facilitate growth they may also require fund providers and associated boards 
with different expertise to help unlock barriers to growth at different phases in the growth life-
cycle (Zahra et al., 2009). At early stages, growing firms are likely to need expertise to 
sharpen the focus of opportunities and to help build commercial skills of the entrepreneurial 
team. More established growing firms are more likely to need board expertise that includes 
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both monitoring skills of financiers and expertise to enable new growth directions such as 
through acquisition and internationalization.  
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The complexity of issues related to financing of entrepreneurial firms is now palpable. It goes 
well beyond the much discussed issues of market failure and information cost driven 
preferences for certain types of financing over others. Growth potential as well as growth 
objectives of entrepreneurs matter, as do entrepreneurial perceptions. Ownership structures 
can preclude certain types of financing and growth potential can interact with some of these 
other factors to ensure that financing needs and the nature of financing gaps vary over a 
firm's life cycle.  
Financing decisions 
Asymmetric information based theories, which have helped to explain market failure, have 
also been developed to examine the demand for financing. The well-known pecking order 
hypothesis emphasises the role of information asymmetries leading to preferences for using 
cheaper internal finance first, only followed by costlier external finance (debt then equity) if 
there are insufficient internal funds (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). Agency theory 
points to conflict in the priorities of entrepreneurs and financiers ± external debt will be more 
available where there is collateral to help align interests (Rajan and Zingales, 1995).   
Overall, the evidence seems to support pecking order and agency theories over tax 
considerations in financing decisions (Michaelas et al., 1999). More profitable firms  use less 
external finance (supporting the pecking order hypothesis) (Chittenden et al, 1996). High 
growth firms, with greater funding needs, are more likely to seek external finance (Cosh et 
al., 2009) although they are more reliant on short term debt (Chittenden et al., 1996). 
Evidence of agency issues is supported by a positive relationship between leverage and 
tangible assets (Harris and Raviv, 1991).  Industry effects, relating to the availability of 
collateral, also affect leverage and debt maturity (Michaelas et al., 1999). Access to external 
finance improves with size and age supporting the idea of a financial growth life-cycle 
(Chittenden et al., 1996). In addition, the economic cycle is important with reliance on short 
term debt increasing in a recession (Michaelas et al., 1999).  
However, these explanations typically explain only between 10% and 30% of observed 
variation in financing decisions. What accounts for the deficit? Entrepreneurial objectives, 
control aversion and risk perceptions are important yet largely ignored in studies of financing 
decisions (Cressy, 1995). Some progress has been made - including business planning, 
growth/lifestyle objectives and the importance of retaining control in models of financing 
decisions raises explanatory power to almost 60% (Romano et al., 2001). We are also in the 
early stages of understanding how cognitive biases may affect finance application decisions 
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(Fraser, 2014). Nonetheless, we still understand relatively little about the role of 
entrepreneurial cognition/perceptions in financing decisions and this is an important area for 
further research.   
Funding gaps and growth 
Rejection rates, the proportion of finance applicants whose applications are turned down, 
are a widely used measure of gaps between finance demand and supply. However, there 
are caveats in the use of rejection rates to measure funding gaps. Essentially, (high) 
rejection rates do not per se point to market failure; finance providers may simply be turning 
down unviable businesses. Consequently, as Figure 1 shows, it is important to examine the 
relationship between funding gaps and business performance to understand financial 
constraints (see below).  
However, firstly we review the evidence on debt/equity funding gaps and how they vary over 
time, business characteristics and location.   
Funding gaps 
Following the 2008 financial crisis, overdraft rejection rates increased in relative terms by 
over 50% in 2009 (compared to 2004) and term loan rejection rates increased by 163% 
controlling for changes in credit risk (Fraser, 2012). Rejection rates for venture capital, are 
much higher than for bank or non-bank debt. For example, a UK study published in 2009 
found that 46% of respondents approaching VCs had experienced rejection and 24% of 
those approaching private individuals, i.e. business angels, had experienced rejection (Cosh 
et al., 2009).  
Loan rejection rates are higher for high risk and smaller firms and firms with shorter banking 
relationships (Fraser, 2009a; Fraser, 2012); larger firms obtain a higher proportion of the 
amount of bank finance sought (Cosh et al., 2009).  This reflects underlying issues relating 
to lack of track record and/or collateral which inhibit access to bank finance. By ethnicity, 
rejection rates are significantly higher among Black and Bangladeshi owned businesses 
although this is largely explained by a lack of collateral and poor credit histories (Fraser, 
2009b). However, in the US, black owned firms are more likely to be denied loans, ceteris 
paribus, raising the possibility of ethnic discrimination (Blanchflower et al., 2003).  
Male founded firms generally obtain a lower proportion of the amount of bank finance sought 
compared to female founded firms (Cosh et al., 2009) consistent with evidence that females 
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are more risk averse (Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998) and therefore tend to run less risky 
ventures. Similarly, high-tech service firms obtain less bank finance (Cosh et al., 2009).  
Also loan/overdraft rejection rates are higher following the financial crisis in Construction, 
Wholesale/Retail, Hotels and Restaurants and Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities 
(reflecting falling asset/property values) (Fraser, 2009a).  
International comparisons of loan rejection rates in 2010 show that rates in the UK were 
higher than Germany, France, Sweden, Italy and Spain but smaller than the Netherlands 
and Ireland (Eurostat, 2011).  However, these differences may reflect differences in risk 
profiles and business support rather than supply side issues; and, regardless, funding gaps 
may not signify market failure.   
Regarding venture capital, various policy measures have been developed as attempts to 
address a perceived equity gap (Babcock-Lumish, 2009). While some improvements in 
venture capital provision for early stage technology based firms have been noted, major 
concerns remain (Lockett et al, 2002). Equity gaps vary between sectors, regions and 
stages of finance. Analysis based on matching characteristics of firms receiving venture 
capital, with those that did not, suggests that the actual amounts funded by venture capital in 
health, pharmaceuticals, household products, insurance, information technology, investment 
companies and speciality finance were significantly below expectations (Wilson and Wright, 
2011).   
Recent evidence suggests that the equity gap for entrepreneurs and the stigma of failure in 
raising VC finance in Europe, especially serial entrepreneurs, is less than previously claimed 
(Axelson and Martinovic, 2013). This research found that the success rates of serial 
entrepreneurs are the same as where serial entrepreneurs are involved in US VC backed 
deals, and that failed entrepreneurs have the same chance of attracting VC funding for 
successive ventures in Europe as in the US.  
There is some debate about whether credit rationing and funding gaps are transitory, arising 
from some temporary disequilibrium or permanent, due to information asymmetries (Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1981). In periods of tight monetary policy exacerbate credit constraints stemming 
from asymmetric information and limited collateral problems. In the presence of such 
constraints on access to funding from borrowing, SMEs may substitute away from bank 
credit through increasing the trade credit they take (Atanasova and Wilson, 2003, 2004; 
Biais and Gollier, 1997). SMEs supply more than £80bn in trade credit and receive more 
than £130bn and were therefore net recipients of around £50bn of trade credit in 2012 
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(Wilson, 2014). Smaller firms are also more likely to utilise trade credit as they come out of 
recession and where bank credit is in relatively short supply. Government schemes such as 
the 8.¶V Trade Credit Enterprise Finance Guarantee (TCEFG) scheme provide further 
support for firms unable to obtain traditional bank lending by enabling suppliers to extend 
trade credit to firms outside their normal risk profiles. Other government schemes designed 
to address the funding constraints faced by SMEs include the Enterprise Finance 
Guarantee, the Supply Chain Finance and the Funding for Lending schemes. The Supply 
Chain Finance scheme helps SMEs obviate the working capital constraints they pay from 
late payments by large customers.  
Temporary financing gaps can also open up for firms with growth potential that have high 
expected growth in cash flows but do not have commensurate collateral. In some cases, the 
funding gaps arise from an unwillingness to raise equity capital or access and use forms of 
funding that can eventually lead to equity dilution. This is particularly true for family firms. For 
these firms, funding can be provided by way of bespoke structured products that are broadly 
classified as mezzanine finance and those that lie ± in terms of characteristics, risk to 
investors and cost to firms ± between senior debt and equity (OECD, 2013). The uptake of 
mezzanine finance is low in EU20 countries, however, and the percentage of unsuccessful 
requests for mezzanine finance in EU20 countries is high compared to other forms of non-
bank finance such as trade credit and leasing (OECD, 2012). The main barriers to growth in 
the market for mezzanine finance are high fixed costs for due diligence relative to deal size 
for smaller SMEs, the absence of exit routes through the market, the greater complexity of 
mezzanine products and greater transparency requirement relative to bank credit, and 
higher cost of mezzanine loans compared to bank credit and senior debt. Some form of 
public support, perhaps through publicly owned (or supported) business banks might 
therefore be necessary to provide growth finance through these financing vehicles. 
Testing financial constraints ± relationship between funding gaps and growth 
We begin by considering evidence from existing approaches to testing financial constraints 
before arguing that a better approach is to examine the relationship between funding gaps 
and growth. The relationship between the availability of internal finance and 
investment/growth is typically seen as evidence of financial constraints. If entrepreneurs are 
unable to obtain enough market funding, then an increase in internal finance will relax 
financial constraints, allowing investment/growth to go ahead.   
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US evidence using this approach indicates financial constraints on new venture creation 
(Evans and Jovanovic, 1989), survival (Holtz-Eakin et al, 1994), sales growth (Holtz-Eakin et 
al, 1994), and employment growth (Haynes and Brown, 2009). However, one study suggests 
the relationship between personal wealth and becoming a business owner is confined to the 
top 5% of the wealth distribution which is inconsistent with financial constraints (Hurst and 
Lusardi, 2004). Instead the relationship may reflect that wealthier individuals are less risk 
averse (and therefore more willing to start a business: Cressy, 2000), have higher human 
capital (and therefore more able to start a business: Cressy, 1996) or that business 
ownership is due to the lifestyle preferences of the wealthy.   
UK studies show financial constraints on business formation/growth based on a positive link 
between receiving an inheritance/windfall and self-employment (Taylor, 2003) or self-
employment income (Taylor, 2003). However there is no evidence that financial constraints 
affect business survival in the UK (Cressy, 1996). More recent UK research, does not find 
significant evidence of changes in the average degree of financing constraint over time, for 
the 2003-2010 period (Bhaumik et al., 2012). The average degree of financial constraint is 
also not significantly different across regions and industrial sectors. However, the distribution 
of the measure of financial constraints within industries suggests that there is significant 
heterogeneity within industries.  
Studies of larger firms have examined the relationship between liquid assets/cash-flows and 
investment XVLQJ7RELQ¶V4WRFontrol for investment opportunities (Carpenter and Petersen, 
2002). Using this approach, evidence of financial constraints on asset growth on US listed 
firms with assets between $5m and $100m has been found (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002).  
A survey of research in this area concludes there is broad evidence of financial constraints 
on investment among firms most affected by information asymmetries/agency costs (e.g., 
smaller firms) in both developed and developing economies (Schiantarelli, 1996). However 
one has to be careful about drawing conclusions from these results about the implications 
for SME finance. Empirical WHVWVRIILQDQFLDOFRQVWUDLQWVLQYROYLQJ7RELQ¶V4DUHLQDSSOLFDEOH
for unlisted firms (i.e., the vast majority of small firms) due to the absence of data relating to 
the market value of the business. 
Even aside from the debate about the interpretation of the cash flow sensitivity of investment 
that acts as the indicator for financial constraint in this literature, a general problem with the 
internal finance approach is that finding a relationship between internal finance and business 
performance may have nothing to do with liquidity. The relationship could instead be due to 
factors relating to the entrepreneur including: human capital (Cressy, 1996); entrepreneurial 
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talent (Hurst and Lusardi, 2004); risk aversion (Cressy, 2000); or entrepreneurial over-
optimism (de Meza and Southey, 1996). In other words, unless we have very good data to 
control for these alternative explanations, there is ambiguity about whether the relationship 
signals actual financial constraints.  
A more direct approach to testing financial constraints looks at the relationship between 
funding gaps and business outcomes.  Funding gaps (adversely) affect business outcomes if 
and only if the firm is financially constrained. If instead the funding gap reflects excessive 
finance demands (due, for example, to over-optimism) then there is no relationship. Hence 
WKH µIXQGLQJJDSVDSSURDFK¶DOORZXV WR IRFXVGLUHFWO\RQPHDVXUDEOH impacts of a lack of 
funding on business outcomes rather than draw inference from indirect evidence about 
financial constraints. 
$QRWKHUDGYDQWDJHRIWKLVµIXQGLQJJDSVDSSURDFK¶LVWKDWLWFDQLGHQWLI\ILQDQFLDOFRQVWUDLQWV
across different entrepreneurial finance markets by looking at the relationship between 
business outcomes and funding gaps in different finance markets. By contrast, even 
assuming the relationship between internal finances and business outcomes captures 
liquidity, it is a blunt approach only able to point to a generic financial constraint. This is of 
limited use to policy makers who need to understand how issues of financial constraints vary 
across different debt/equity finances and the potential (differential) returns, principally 
increased employment, from relaxing these constraints. 7KH µIXQGLQJ JDSV DSSURDFK¶ LV
better able to provide policy makers with this kind of specific information.   
At the same time, cognitive issues may also affect investment decisions and contribute to 
funding gaps. In this respect, financial discouragement may lead to under-investment where 
viable businesses decide not to seek finance (Fraser, 2014).  Again, this suggests a 
(negative) relationship between discouragement and growth exists if and only if 
discouragement leads to under investment; alternatively discouragement may be 
economically efficient (suggesting no relationship with growth) if unviable businesses decide 
not to seek finance because they (rightly) believe they will be turned down (Han et al., 2009).  
,QLWLDO DSSOLFDWLRQV RI WKH µIXQGLQJ JDSV DSSURDFK¶ XVLQJ 8.60() GDWD IRU -2009 
indicate that small business growth is constrained by a lack of working capital controlling for 
a wide range of other business/owner characteristics (Fraser, 2011). There is also evidence 
of cognitive constraints on growth inasmuch as discouraged term loan borrowers grew 
significantly more slowly (ceteris paribus) than businesses which successfully applied for 
term loans (Fraser, 2011). However, much more research is required to understand how the 
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impacts of funding gaps on performance vary over the financial life cycle of the firm and 
across different debt/equity finances.  
Venture capital and firm growth ± more than finance?  
The emphasis so far has been on issues affecting the supply and demand of finance and the 
impact on growth. However, finance providers often do more than simply supply businesses 
with finance. Whilst both banks and VCs monitor the businesses they are engaged with to 
reduce agency risk, VCs (unlike banks) are not confined to the monitoring dimension of 
governance; VCs are also active in providing added value services which may be especially 
important to facilitate growth.  
We therefore conclude our overview of the relationship between entrepreneurial finance and 
growth by looking at the relationship between VC and firm growth with a view to 
understanding the role of VC added value services. In relation to earlier and later stages in 
the financial growth cycle, we also look at the impact of business angel finance and private 
equity buy-outs on growth.     
Evidence from several countries generally shows a positive relationship between VC 
backing and firm performance (Manigart and Wright, 2013). Evidence from matching VC and 
non-VC backed firms by size has shown that VC backed firms grow revenues faster. 
Similarly,  VC backed firms also have higher asset and employment growth than non-VC 
backed firms. The benefits of VC-backing may contribute to higher productivity growth both 
leading up to an exit, notably through an IPO, as well as afterwards. In contrast, some other 
studies of the growth of VC and non-VC backed firms that went to IPO have found no effect 
of VC backing on post-IPO growth. In a Canadian study VCs, along with business angels 
and bank financing have been shown to contribute significantly to sales growth in 
biotechnology firms while there is apparently no impact of funding from government, alliance 
partners and IPOs (Ahmed and Cozzarin, 2009). However, portfolio firms backed by 
experienced government-related VC firms have higher survival rates compared to those 
backed by independent VC firms, mainly because government VC firms often have a 
UHJLRQDO HFRQRPLF GHYHORSPHQW JRDO DQG KHQFH SUHIHU WR NHHS WKH ³OLYLQJ GHDG´ DOLYH 
(Manigart et al., 2002). Portfolio firms backed by inexperienced government-related VCs had 
higher failure rates. 
Companies backed by VC investors have a higher tendency to internationalize than those 
funded only by internal owners who tend to be more risk averse (George et al., 2005). 
Similarly, higher equity-holdings of VC firms are associated with the development of the 
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knowledge-based resources needed for internationalization. The monitoring expertise of 
VCs appears to be most effective in promoting export behavior for late-stage ventures, while 
9&V¶ YDOXH-added skills are more important in promoting export behavior in early-stage 
venture (Lockett et al., 2008). Venture capital firms may also be closely involved in 
relocating portfolio companies from developing to developed markets to better enable 
access to resources, trading partners and stock markets as an exit route. They thereby 
SRVLWLYHO\ FRQWULEXWH WR D SRUWIROLR ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDOL]DWLRQ The nature of the financing 
provided by VCs influences the extent of internationalization. Staged financing and financing 
through a syndicate have positive effects on internationalization when used separately but 
not when used in combination. 
Several important issues contribute to explaining these different findings. Some growth 
studies have been cross-sectional in nature and have often failed to address the issue of 
survivor bias and endogeneity in VC backing. Differentiating between selection and 
treatment effects is especially important in the VC context as VCs select ventures with 
specific characteristics, which differ from ventures not seeking venture capital (Bertoni et al., 
2011).  
Disentangling the effect of value adding of VC firms from the mere effect of receiving more 
financial funds is also important. One meta-analysis concluded that VC portfolio companies 
have higher growth rates compared to non-VC backed companies, but a large fraction of the 
difference is explained by VCs selecting high growth industries (Rosenbusch et al., 
2013).There is evidence that VCs select firms with higher total factor productivity (TFP), 
sales and salaries, which then growth faster after receiving VC. 
Different VC investors contribute differently to portfolio firm growth because they are driven 
by differences in goals, knowledge and processes employed. For example, independent 
VCs may have limited time horizons because of their closed end funds but have greater 
expertise in adding value to portfolio companies than public sector or captive VCs (Manigart 
and Wright, 2013). 
The type of VC matters in other ways. Traditional financial VCs rather than corporate VCs 
appear to strongly spur employment and sales revenue growth in their portfolio companies. 
Companies, backed by independent VC firms, grow more strongly in sales in the first years 
after VC backing compared to companies backed by corporate VC firms, but not in 
employees. Differences disappear in the long term, however. The apparent disappearance 
of long term differences may reflect the earlier exit of high growth ventures from independent 
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9&ILUPV¶SRUWIROLRV,PSRUWDQWO\WKHVHOHFWLRQHIIHFWE\LQGHSHQGHQW9&VDSSHDUVWREHVPDOO
with growth mainly coming from the treatment effect shortly after the first VC investment 
(Bertoni et al., 2011; Bertoni et al., 2013). 
VCs differ in their reputations, skills and expertise. Low-reputation VCs rely on selecting 
more efficient firms to begin with (screening), but high-reputation VCs are able to improve 
the efficiency of the firms they invest in to a greater extent, through greater increases in 
sales with lower increases in production costs. An examination of the influence of human 
capital and VC backing on the growth of VC backed new technology based firms (NTBFs) in 
Italy found, after controlling for survivor bias and the endogeneity of VC funding, that once a 
17%) UHFHLYHV 9& EDFNLQJ WKH UROH RI IRXQGHUV¶ VNLOOV EHFRPHV OHVV LPSRUWDQW DQG WKH
coaching skills of VCs become more important in contributing to firm growth.  
Portfolio companies receiving funding from domestic VC investors grow more strongly in the 
short run, but those backed by cross border VC investors grow more strongly in the long run. 
Portfolio companies backed by a syndicate comprising both domestic and cross border VC 
investors outperform all other combinations. While domestic investors have expertise about 
local conditions, cross border investors have the expertise to enable growth in international 
markets which may take longer to come to fruition (Devigne et al., 2013; Mäkelä and Maula, 
2006). 
There is a general debate about whether growth adequately reflects performance with some 
arguing that it is important to consider profitability as well (Davidsson et al., 2009). Growth 
studies have tended to focus on product market performance without considering the role of 
VCs and the financial market. VCs tend to focus on stimulating growth rather than improving 
profitability, with there being no difference in profitability between VC backed firms and 
matched non-VC backed firms at the time of exit by the VC backed firms. This apparent 
contradictory finding may be consistent with VCs seeking to build value in revenue and 
technology markets, which take time to feed through into profitability, in order to obtain 
higher valuations in sales to strategic buyers or through IPOs where the focus is on future 
earnings growth (Clarysse et al., 2011).   
More firms receive business angel financing than is the case for venture capital (Cosh et al., 
2009). Business angel investment tends to be complementary to venture capital especially 
for smaller investments. Compared to early stage venture capital investments, business 
angels tend to avoid bad investments but find fewer where they earn significant returns 
(Parhankangas, 2012). Business angels¶ involvement in their investments tends to be 
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different from formal venture capital firms notably being more flexible regarding monitoring 
requirements but making less contribution in times of distress (Ehrlich et al., 1994). There is 
some debate about whether business angels predominantly invest locally because of their 
personal networks and because this facilitates hands-on involvement. However, a significant 
minority of angel investments are long distance beyond immediately adjacent counties to the 
DQJHOV¶KRPHORFDWLRQ (Harrison et al., 2012).  
Some problems in assessing the impact of business angels on growth concern the 
availability of data, with many studies using convenience samples which may be biased. 
There is also a lack of comparative analysis of the impact of business angels on firm growth 
compared with other sources of finance. 
Besides the classic venture capital reviewed above, private equity (PE) finance also 
provides support for established firms undergoing restructuring through a change in 
ownership (management buyouts and buy-ins) (CMBOR, 2013). Close monitoring by PE 
investors can add value in firms that have been constrained in realizing their growth 
opportunities under their previous ownership regime (Wood and Wright, 2010; Bacon et al., 
2010). Further, PE investors can structure deals with debt instruments that allow for servicing 
costs to be aligned with investment needs.  
Evidence from systematic studies worldwide shows positive effects on growth (Gilligan and 
Wright, 2012). These studies identified growth along a variety of measures, although the 
effects seem less strong than in the first wave. PE involvement generally leads to growth in 
labour productivity, although the effects on employment are less clear cut. In France, recent 
evidence from generally smaller buyouts shows growth in operating performance, 
productivity and employment (Boucly et al., 2011). In the UK, PE ownership adds 
significantly to growth in operating profitability of PE backed buyouts over the first three 
years post-buyout, compared to peers. Growth was greater in buyouts funded by more 
experienced PE firms with closer involvement in their portfolio companies (Meuleman et al., 
2009). U.K. evidence also shows that while employment appears to fall initially, this is 
generally followed by subsequent growth, especially for management buyouts but less so for 
management buy-ins (Amess et al., 2008).  
A recent study covering the population of UK firms over the period 1995-2012 finds a 
consistent pattern of PE backed buyouts showing higher growth rates than non-PE backed 
buyouts for the first four years post buyout especially in terms of value added (Wilson and 
Wright, 2013; Wilson et al., 2012).  After this period, the picture is less clear but non-PE 
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backed buyouts tend to display higher average growth. The study found clear evidence of 
growth and performance improvement post-buyout compared to the pre-buyout period. For 
the recessionary sub-period 2008-2011, PE backed buyouts are significantly and positively 
DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK JURZWK VXJJHVWLQJ WKH 3( EDFNHG ILUPV¶ JURZWK KDV KHOG XS EHWWHU WKDQ
non-PE backed private companies. Controlling for other factors, the extent of UK experience 
of PE firms is significant and positively associated with growth in value added, assets, sales, 
equity and employment.  
Emerging forms: Supply chain financing, crowdfunding, peer-to-peer lending, 
accelerators  
Recent developments including supply chain finance (referred to earlier), peer to peer 
lending and crowd-funding may further help to fill gaps in the supply of bank funding 
(Breedon, 2012). These sources of finance are currently used by only a very small minority 
of small businesses.  This is due to both a lack of availability and behavioral barriers crowd-
funding) (SME Finance Monitor, 2013), a lack of financial expertise and a lack of confidence 
in being able to obtain these sources of funding.   
However, from a low base crowdfunding is growing rapidly. The different approaches to 
crowdfunding comprise gifting, reward, loan and equity models. Individuals with small 
amounts to invest have been attracted to loan forms of crowdfunding because of the 
apparent greater returns available than from bank deposit savings (Schwienbacher,  
Belleflamme and Lambert, 2013). Equity crowdfunding has experienced slower growth than 
other models but recent regulatory developments may facilitate growth (FCA, 2014). 
Nevertheless, there is debate about the likely effectiveness of crowdfunding in helping SMEs 
to grow  (Harrison, 2013; Mollick, 2014). Although the ability to obtain follow-on funding is 
emerging, entrepreneurs lack the support that other types of investors may provide. 
Investors face some difficulties in conducting due diligence on investments, creating a 
µOHPRQV¶ SUREOHP although this may be alleviated to some extent by the development of 
reputation systems, friendship networks, and discussion boards (Tomboc, 2013). However, 
entrepreneurs may be able to provide potentially misleading signals about the quality of an 
investment by getting their personal networks to invest early on in the online investment 
process (Franzoni et al., 2014). 
One of the issues associated with alternative modes of financing such as crowdfunding or 
peer-to-peer lending is that these investors may not be in a position to undertake the roles 
played by investors and financial intermediaries aside from providing funding or capital. 
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Traditional investors, whether equity or bond holders, can facilitate governance issues in 
firms in which they invest, by way of market discipline. Financial intermediaries ± banks in 
particular ± can, on the other hand, monitor debtor firms on behalf of the dispersed group of 
depositors whose savings are used to provide credit, thereby resolving incentive problems 
between lenders and borrowers (Diamond, 1984). While the platforms used for crowdfunding 
and peer-to-peer lending may facilitate the flow of information in a way that results in better 
monitoring and governance (Moenninghoff and Wieandt, 2013), the exact role of the 
providers of these alternative forms of financing in the context of monitoring and governance 
remains somewhat unclear.   
 
Accelerators involve programmes enabling entrepreneurs to access initial amounts of 
funding together with mentoring support from experienced entrepreneurs and business 
angels (Miller and Bound, 2011). Three broad strategic foci of accelerators have been 
identified: ecosystem developers, investors and matchmakers (Clarysse, Wright and Van 
Hove, 2014). Ecosystem builders aim to create business ecosystems as well as to try to 
reduce the rate of failure of young ventures. They are typically publicly funded and tend to 
select entrepreneurial teams in the idea stage onwards. Investors and matchmakers prefer 
ventures with a working prototype and more mature teams. As expected, investors have a 
business model of a high-risk investment fund and are sponsored by private investors and/or 
corporates. In contrast matchmakers have a focus on customers and implement structured 
methods to drive this. Some accelerators are generic, while others focus on providing 
focused support for early stage ventures in particular sectors. Accelerators may help 
entrepreneurs better attract funding from venture capital firms and business angels, but the 
challenges in bridging to this next stage of achieving growth are little understood. 
Researchers need more data about non-standard sources of finance to better understand 
the factors that might influence take-up of these sources and their success rates.  
 
Discussion and conclusions 
Our examination of the academic literature indicates that the underlying issues go well 
beyond traditional discussions of market failure to include contingencies such as differences 
in entrepreneurial cognition, objectives, ownership types and firm life-cycle stages. Whilst we 
have outlined what we know about entrepreneurial finance and its relationship with growth, 
significant gaps in our understanding of both these issues remain. In this respect we believe 
future research should address, among others, the following key issues:  
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Understanding financing decisions 
It is important to KDYH D EHWWHU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI ILQDQFLQJ GHFLVLRQV IRU D µW\SLFDO ILUP¶ DV
studies usually fail to take into account non-random selection.  In this respect studying both 
application and approval/rejection decisions which underlie financing outcomes is important.  
Other less well understood issues relate to how entrepreneurs combine financial products 
(as complements or substitutes) and the impact of different (possibly second best) 
combinations on business performance.   
Researchers need more data about non-standard sources of finance to better understand 
the factors that might influence take-up of these sources.  
The role of finance and entrepreneurial cognition in explaining firm growth 
We know comparatively little about the impact of financial constraints on small business 
growth due to the limitations oIµLQWHUQDOILQDQFHDSSURDFKHV¶WRWHVWLQJILQDQFLDOFRQVWUDLQWV.  
Future research needs to examine the impact of funding gaps on growth and how this varies 
over specific types of finances and across different types of business.  There is also a need 
for more research to better understand (potential) cognitive constraints, including 
discouragement, on investment/financing decisions and growth.      
Governance, finance and growth 
There is a need to consider how different ownership and governance regimes and their 
associated financing influence the nature of entrepreneurial growth. Longer term, lower risk-
taking perspectives typically attributed to family firms may influence their willingness to take 
on external finance to realize growth potential. For family firms, part of their processes for 
securing longer term survival may be to ring-fence riskier activities in separate entities from 
the main family business. There is little evidence on the opportunities identified to be ring-
fenced, the funding of these activities, which family members are involved and at what point 
growth in the ring-fenced venture is such that it can be deemed a success or a failure.    
Involvement of financiers 
There is limited research linking VC characteristics and portfolio company outcomes such as 
innovation, internationalization and growth. More in-depth investigation is warranted. 
Research on the processes both by which VC firms orchestrate their own resources and 
capabilities and how they do so in portfolio companies is limited.  In particular, there is a 
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need to understand both what resources and capabilities are needed for growth and to know 
how to accumulate, bundle and leverage them to generate sustainable growth.  
Modes and patterns of growth and finance 
Few firms experience sustained high or even stable growth over long periods. Most fast 
JURZWK ILUPV H[SHULHQFH µHUUDWLF RQH-VKRW¶ JURZWK RYHU D VKRUW SHULRG ZLWK RVFLOODWLQJ
development around a low minimum level (Delmar et al, 2003). Firms may grow organically 
but in many sectors acquisition are important growth modes, either to consolidate mature 
sectors or gain access to new developments in high tech sectors (McKelvie and Wiklund, 
2010). These different growth patterns create demands for different types of long and short 
term finance that have yet to be analysed. 
Scaling-up and finance 
Finance sources such as boot-strap finance, bricolage, and crowd-funding are frequently 
used to start businesses. Accelerators and start-up factories can play an important role in 
enabling entrepreneurs overcome the initial phases of start-up including the provision of pre-
seed finance (Miller and Bound, 2011). These funding sources help facilitate start-ups 
requiring smaller amounts of funding than would be attractive to traditional sources. 
However, at present we need to know more about which type of accelerator is appropriate 
for new ventures with different business models. Further, although these funding sources 
may help create a pipeline for venture capital firms and business angels, important 
challenges remain in bridging to the next stage in the financial growth life-cycle. More 
research is needed to examine how this bridging can be best achieved.  
Further probing into the above research areas can have immediate and significant impact by 
helping identify factors such as the specific financing needs of SMEs with certain 
combinations of age, ownership and other characteristics which, in turn, can feed into 
strategic discussions of organizations like the British Business Bank. A better understanding 
of the link between alternative sources of finance and sustained growth can, at the same 
time, inform policy decisions about the creation of institutional infrastructure within which 
relevant modes of financing will thrive. The importance of the research agenda discussed 
above cannot, therefore, be overemphasized. 
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